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If the SC had intended to reserve to itself the right to
authorise force by means of a further resolution, it could
obviously have done so. Indeed this approach was
discussed informally by members of the Security Council
but never became the subject of a draft resolution or vote;
see Hansard, 25 November 2002 at page 53 (per the
Foreign Secretary).
The SC could also have qualified its reference to
resolutions 678 and 687, and thus made it clear that
member states could not use force to deal with the threat
posed to peace and security by Iraq. It did not do so. The
fact that there is now some disagreement as to what was
meant by SCR 1441 cannot prevent the words of that
resolution (or indeed the earlier resolutions) from carrying
their plain and ordinary meaning.
CONCLUSION
The use of necessary and proportionate force, in
accordance with international humanitarian law by
coalition forces, to neutralise the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein’s failure to comply with UN imposed
disarmament obligations can be rooted in:
• SCR 678 (authority to use force);
• SCR 687 (the requirement for the Iraqi regime to,
inter alia, disarm so as to remove the threat to
international peace and security it posed);
• SCR 1441 (confirmation of SCR’s 678, 687, and of the
fact that Iraq’s continued non-compliance with
disarmament obligations triggered serious
consequences).
Post intervention, emerging issues are likely to include
the following:
• Possible attempts to challenge the intervention at the
International Court of Justice (compare with the
attempt to challenge the NATO action in Kosovo in
March 1999);
• Possible attempts to persuade the DPP to carry out a
“war crimes” investigation in the event that UK forces
bomb civilian targets and/or an argument can be made
to this effect;
• War crimes trials/asset freezing action in respect of
Saddam and/or his accomplices;
• Security Council interaction on humanitarian issues
and post conflict issues in Iraq – potential for other
states to use this as a platform to condemn the
intervention and/or using this to effect “retrospective
legitimacy”.
Khawar Qureshi
Barrister and Treasury Counsel, Serle Court Chambers
Ibase my view on child protection on an analysis ofdomestic legislation and case law in several domesticjurisdictions. It is important to clarify at the outset that
I can only attempt to convince the reader of a general
pattern of distortion and that different legal systems differ
in the degree of compatibility between the reality of child
protection, and its portrayal in child law rhetoric.
My thesis is based around the following six
complementary claims:
1. Child protection law is typically perceived through its
aims and mandates as offering the child comprehensive
protection from all harm.
2. These aims and mandates disguise a preoccupation
State protection of the
child – mirage or
reality?
by Dr Ya’ir Ronen
My central point in this article is that state protection of the child as
projected by the legal rhetoric of child protection law is a mirage in
that it gives the misleading impression of comprehensive protection
to the child from all harm while typically failing to offer such
protection.
with protection from individuals directly responsible
for bringing up the child.
3. Consideration of the child’s best interests as the
paramount consideration under laws aimed at
remedying harm already done to the child is not
equivalent to comprehensive responsibility for the
child, but nevertheless diverts attention from a lacking
infrastructure of social rights.
4. The ethos of liberal individualism as implied in child
protection case law and literature often ignores some of
the child’s fundamental needs.
5. The language of needs when not coupled by
recognition of legal participation rights within child
protection law is liable to distort the child’s story and
the meaning he/she gives to her suffering and well being.
6. In certain situations legal principles when not
translated to unequivocal rules mandating specific state
action are liable to expose the child to continued harm.
1. A LANGUAGE OF COMPREHENSIVE
PROTECTION FROM ALL HARM
A child in need of state protection is often defined as any
child who may suffer emotional or physical harm. The aim
of child protection law is often formulated as the
prevention of all such harm to the child, whether by action
or by inaction. Most legal systems do not adopt a narrow
definition of child abuse enumerating a conclusive list of
factual situations of abuse. An open-ended definition of
abuse allows responsiveness to different types of abuse.
Different laws enumerate different instances of abuse and
neglect, only a few of which explicitly mention the behavior
of the child’s parents or that of those responsible for
him/her.
2. BRINGING UP CHILDREN AND STATE
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
These laws allow those interpreting them to believe that
the primary risk to the child derives from those directly
responsible for him/her and that from them the law should
primarily aim to protect him. Law can protect children
through proof of need. By seeing parents as solely
responsible for responding to the child’s needs, law is liable
to become preoccupied with evidential issues of parental
wrongdoing in order to justify intervention. I am not
convinced that this preoccupation as inevitable or deriving
from the fundamental nature of the law. I suggest it be seen
as a challenge to recognize more fully the child’s needs.
3. THE MEANING OF PARAMOUNCY OF
CHILDREN’S INTERESTS IN REMEDYING
HARM TO THE CHILD
Once harm to the child has been identified, his/her
interests are often paramount and he/she may receive a
remedy under child law despite infringement on the
interests of others such as biological kin, foster parents or
adoptive parents.
There has been an ongoing struggle between children’s
rights proponents and proponents of family autonomy and
parental rights, and the present state of child protection
law signifies clear progress for those championing the
child’s interests. State protection from harm is widening its
scope and mandating greater intervention into family life,
thus infringing on what were perceived in the past as
parental rights. This trend is mirrored in legislation and
case law relating to domestic violence, adoption and
guardianship. These fields of law become more and more
child-centred in the remedies offered once harm to the
child is identified. This state of affairs is liable to be
equated with the paramouncy of children’s interests under
law. Commitment to children’s interests in specific
situations of proven harm and the tone of compassion
towards their suffering in case law, public inquiries and
Parliamentary debates may naturally lead one to the
conclusion that this commitment mirrors comprehensive
state responsibility for the child.
We are thus tempted to forget what is probably the main
insight deriving from the legacy of Goldstein, Solnit and
Freud in their trilogy “In the best interests of the Child”,
an insight incorporated into case law in different
jurisdictions when dealing with the determination of the
disputed guardianship of children. State action to protect
the child is always only the least detrimental alternative and
therefore cannot be equated with paramouncy of children’s
interests under law. Therefore, according children’s
interests paramouncy in situations where remedies for
harm which already occurred are sought and offered by the
state cannot be seen as mirroring comprehensive state
protection
4. THE ETHOS OF LIBERAL
INDIVIDUALISM AND CHILDREN’S
FUNDAMENTAL NEEDS
An ethos of liberal individualism does not foster state
responsibility for hunger, homelessness, a violent
educational environment or inadequate healthcare or the
non-existence of counselling services. It is concerned
primarily with liberties, but hungry or bullied children,
those who have been separated from their parents because
they became homeless, or have no recourse to counselling
may invest all their personal resources into physical and
emotional survival. They have little interest in civil liberties
such as freedom of expression or freedom of conscience.
They have little chance of becoming autonomous adults
who will implement liberties, as liberal theory would imagine
adults as able of doing. They often perceive their civil
liberties as useless to them and to a degree their perception
makes sense from a psychological resiliency perspective.
This ethos forces some writers to opt to an economic
rationale to justify Social rights as part of child protection 5





law. Furthermore, children often have a complex set of
identifications and despite abuse or neglect within their
families and communities, ties with these often remain
important to them. An atomistic or individualistic ethos
does not foster authentic self-actualization cognizant of the
vitality of such ties to the formation of identity. We have to
remember that protection of the child’s identity and
autonomy interest is different from protecting those of
adults. Liberal individualistic rights discourse is liable to aid
reconstruction of a social problem – the problem of harm
to children – as a bundle of private disputes between
individuals. According to this reconstruction, the sole role
of the state is advocacy of the child in relation to those who
are intimately responsible for his well being.
The well accepted imagery of the state as one corner of
a triangle with parents and children as the other corners is
one expression of this reconstruction. It is an imagery of
rivalry and competition. Though the state and parents may
at times need to compete and be rivals in a struggle to
define what is best for the child and uphold children’s
interests despite parental opposition, this individualist
imagery is distorting. For children to develop their
potential the state should essentially be one of many
resources the child has.
5. THE LANGUAGE OF NEEDS AND
DISTORTION OF THE CHILD’S STORY
Despite my criticism of liberal individualism – an ethos
which often underlies claims for children’s rights,
especially participation rights – recognition of children’s
participation rights seems indispensable if state
responsibility for child protection is to become a reality.
Seeing a child care professional as a sole expert in the
definition of the child’s rights is dis-empowering to the
child. The child may find it difficult to express anger and
frustration towards the professional when he feels injustice
has been done to him/her. A child who has no right to
participate in defining what are abuse and neglect and what
is protection from them under law cannot effectively
challenge professional thinking of children in need of
protection solely as children with problems. A child’s
creative ability to overcome adversity is thus liable to be
ignored.
I suggest that recognition of participation rights enables
new stories to be heard and expose the limitations of our
present understanding as to the injustices and suffering
endured by children.
6. PRINCIPLES, RULES AND
CONTINUATION OF PREVENTABLE HARM
Certainly adequate protection of children’s rights
demands an often-complicated act of balancing between
competing interests of children. However, this seems to
have been used as an excuse not to formulate and enforce
unequivocal legal rules in situations where there is clear
harm to the child if a certain course of state action is not
taken. My claims is that we may over-complicate child
protection law, thereby denying the child social rights and
maintaining a mirage of state responsibility for the child.
However the infrastructure for change is present through
social science literature and the conceptual framework of
international child law.
To cite one example of a starting point, the UN
guidelines for the prevention of juvenile delinquency offer
a set of guidelines which mirror recognition of the harm
caused by entering formal systems such as the child
protection system or the juvenile justice system, and
emphasize preventive policies. Their title may be wrongly
perceived as inaccurate as they adopt a proactive preventive
approach to juvenile delinquency which does not target
mainly those who have been identified as juvenile
offenders, but much larger populations. Child protection
law does not, typically, adopt the widely framed aims of the
guidelines, and nor does it, typically, implement the policy
outlines in the guidelines.
The guidelines, which lack binding legal force in
domestic laws, have yet to be implemented through social
rights geared to respond to the child’s needs in the specific
child protection context.
SUMMARY
My conclusions derive from my claims: I believe the
human rights community needs to engage in a serious
debate as to the allocation of social rights to the child in the
child protection context, and for that purpose must re-
examine the problematics of liberal individualism as its
underlying ethos. Adoption of preventive policies which
aim to protect both the child’s autonomy and identity can
be responsive to different trends in child law, such as the
recognition of open adoption or prevention of juvenile
delinquency and school exclusion.
Legal principles translated to unequivocal rules mandating
specific state action may offer the child more realistic
protection, and divert some attention from parents or
professionals (who may indeed be blameworthy, but only to
a degree). The legal reform envisioned cannot but
challenge the perception that society is committed to child
protection by exposing the ambivalence of comprehensive
protection. I claim this is a worthy challenge.
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